Technology licensing is an important form of exchange in business-to-business markets. Licensees consider licensing technologies as a key mechanism to expand their technological asset base and to innovate. Even though exchange is the central focus of marketing academia, technology licensing contracts as a form of exchange have been largely overlooked. We take some steps to fill this void by studying the role of governance in licensing contracts. We rely on governance and specifically agency theory to study two-sided moral hazard problems in technology licensing. The two-sided nature of the problem is reflected in the presence of both upstream monitoring (i.e., the licensee monitoring the licensor) and downstream monitoring (i.e., the licensee being monitored by the licensor). We demonstrate that the effects of monitoring on licensee value creation are conditional on the licensee’s experience in licensing. Specifically, we observe that, conditional on the licensee having accumulated a high level of licensing experience, upstream process monitoring and downstream output monitoring increase licensee market value while downstream process monitoring reduces licensee market value. Interestingly, we find no support for similar moderating effects of partner-specific experience. We rely on a unique database of original licensing contracts, historical data on past licensing contracts, and stock price data to analyze the value created by individual licensing contracts. The combined results may help licensees draft more valuable contracts.

技术许可是企业对企业市场中一种重要的交换形式。被许可方将许可技术视为扩大其技术资产基础和进行创新的关键机制。尽管交换是营销学界的中心焦点，但作为交换形式的技术许可合同却在很大程度上被忽视了。我们通过研究治理在许可合同中的作用采取了一些措施来填补这一空白。我们依靠治理，特别是代理理论来研究技术许可中的双边道德风险问题。问题的两面性反映在上游监控（即被许可人监控许可人）和下游监控（即被许可人被许可人监控）的存在上。我们证明，监控对被许可人价值创造的影响取决于被许可人在许可方面的经验。具体而言，我们观察到，在被许可人积累了高水平的许可经验的条件下，上游过程监控和下游输出监控会增加被许可人的市场价值，而下游过程监控会降低被许可人的市场价值。有趣的是，我们发现不支持合作伙伴特定体验的类似调节作用。我们依靠原始许可合同的独特数据库、过去许可合同的历史数据和股票价格数据来分析单个许可合同所创造的价值。综合结果可能有助于被许可人起草更有价值的合同。以被许可人积累了高水平的许可经验为条件，上游过程监控和下游输出监控会增加被许可人的市场价值，而下游过程监控会降低被许可人的市场价值。有趣的是，我们发现不支持合作伙伴特定体验的类似调节作用。我们依靠原始许可合同的独特数据库、过去许可合同的历史数据和股票价格数据来分析单个许可合同所创造的价值。综合结果可能有助于被许可人起草更有价值的合同。以被许可人积累了高水平的许可经验为条件，上游过程监控和下游输出监控会增加被许可人的市场价值，而下游过程监控会降低被许可人的市场价值。有趣的是，我们发现不支持合作伙伴特定体验的类似调节作用。我们依靠原始许可合同的独特数据库、过去许可合同的历史数据和股票价格数据来分析单个许可合同所创造的价值。综合结果可能有助于被许可人起草更有价值的合同。我们发现不支持合作伙伴特定体验的类似调节作用。我们依靠原始许可合同的独特数据库、过去许可合同的历史数据和股票价格数据来分析单个许可合同所创造的价值。综合结果可能有助于被许可人起草更有价值的合同。我们发现不支持合作伙伴特定体验的类似调节作用。我们依靠原始许可合同的独特数据库、过去许可合同的历史数据和股票价格数据来分析单个许可合同所创造的价值。综合结果可能有助于被许可人起草更有价值的合同。