Abstract

Drawing upon Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, I apply the laws of mereology—the study of parts and wholes—to the analysis of time-consciousness in his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), arguing that Husserl’s phenomenological solution to problems raised by empirical psychology in the late nineteenth century concerning the relation between subject and object was inspired by a rethinking of the notion of intentionality in terms of an extensional whole. Turning, then, to descriptions from Husserl’s careful analyses of tone and melody in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), I claim that melody’s structure of expression pertains specifically to retention (which I distinguish from recollection) as a nonindependent part of a flowing whole. This mereologic reformulation helps us think through the problem of how a melody is perceived in time. Furthermore, I show how, according to Husserl, there is a unity of the sensation of “tone” and the “flow of consciousness,” and I argue that by understanding this unity as a whole of nonindependent parts, we grasp a significant insight that illuminates phenomenology’s overall aim of considering the evidence of empirical science together with the formal laws of logic.

中文翻译：

---

时间意识的非独立部分：胡塞尔的早期现象学研究和旋律的感知

摘要

借鉴埃德蒙·胡塞尔的逻辑研究，我将论断律（对部分和整体的研究）应用于《论内部时间意识的现象学》（1893 – 1917年）中的时间意识分析，认为胡塞尔的现象学解决方案是19世纪末期由经验心理学提出的有关主观与客体之间关系的问题的灵感来自于对意向性概念的扩展整体的重新思考。然后，转向胡塞尔对“内部时间意识现象学”（1893 – 1917年）的语气和旋律的仔细分析中的描述。，我声称旋律的表达结构特别适合于作为流动整体的非独立部分的保留（我将其与recollection区别开）。这种单调的重新表述可以帮助我们思考如何及时感知旋律的问题。此外，根据胡塞尔（Husserl）的观点，我展示了“音调”和“意识流”感觉如何统一，并且我认为通过将这种统一理解为一个非独立部分的整体，我们掌握了一个重要的见解，即阐明了现象学的总体目标，即考虑经验科学的证据以及逻辑的形式定律。