Abstract:

Reid's dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial. I consider and reject Powell's suggestion that Hume could have advanced a "Content Contrary" account of denial that avoids Reid's dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content Contrary account be viciously circular, textual evidence suggests that Hume did not hold such an account. I then argue that Govier's distinction between force and vivacity cannot help Hume. Not only did Hume fail to recognize this distinction, we can advance a variant of Reid's dilemma even if we distinguish force from vivacity.

摘要：

里德的困境得出的结论是，无论与否定命题相关的想法是生动的还是淡淡的，休is都致力于说它要么被相信，要么仅被构想。在任何情况下都不会否认。如果是这样，那么休ume（Hume）无法给出充分的否认理由。我考虑并拒绝鲍威尔的建议，即休ume可以提出一种“内容相反”的否认方式，从而避免了里德的困境。但是，Humean Content Contrary帐户不仅会恶性循环，而且文字证据表明，休ume并未持有该帐户。然后，我认为格维耶在武力与活力之间的区别无济于休。休ume不仅没有认识到这种区别，即使我们区分力与活力，我们也可以推进里德困境的变体。