Abstract

The March 2011 nuclear accident (3.11) shook Japan’s nuclear energy policy to its core. In 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to government with a pro-nuclear policy and the intention to swiftly restart nuclear power plants. In 2020, however, only six nuclear reactors were in operation. Why has the progress of nuclear restarts been so slow despite apparent political support? This article investigates the process of restarting nuclear power plants. The key finding is that the ‘nuclear village’, centered on the LDP, Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, and the nuclear industry, which previously controlled both nuclear policy goal-setting and implementation, remained in charge of policy decision making, i.e. goal-setting, but lost policy implementation power to an extended conflict over nuclear reactor restarts. The main factors that changed the politics of nuclear reactor restarts are Japan’s new nuclear safety agency, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), and a substantial increase in the number of citizens’ class-action lawsuits against nuclear reactors. These findings highlight the importance of assessing both decision making and implementation in assessments of policy change.

中文翻译：

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核重启政治：“核村”如何失去政策执行力

摘要

2011年3月的核事故（3.11）使日本的核能政策动摇了。2012年，自民党以亲核政策重返政府，并打算迅速重启核电厂。但是，到2020年，只有六个核反应堆在运行。尽管有明显的政治支持，为什么核重启的进展如此缓慢？本文研究了重启核电站的过程。关键发现是，以自民党，经济产业省和核工业为中心的“核村”，以前控制着核政策目标的制定和实施，仍然负责政策决策，即目标设定，但由于重新启动核反应堆而导致的冲突扩大，失去了政策执行权。改变核反应堆重启政策的主要因素是日本新成立的核安全机构核监管局（NRA），以及针对核反应堆的公民集体诉讼的数量大幅增加。这些发现突出了在评估政策变化时评估决策和执行的重要性。