This paper studies the political sustainability of programs that are targeted toward the poor. Given that the poor to whom these programs cater do not constitute a majority, we show that for their own good it pays to let the middle class benefit from them in a random way. This approach mimics the actual institutional arrangements whereby middle-class individuals feel that they can successfully apply to the programs. We consider a two stage decision process: first a Rawlsian government chooses the probability at which the middle class is allowed to benefit from a given program; then, majority voting determines the level of benefit and the rate of contribution. At the first, constitutional stage, the government cannot commit to a specific level of taxes and benefit but anticipates that these are set by majority voting in the second stage.

本文研究了针对贫困人口的计划的政治可持续性。鉴于这些计划所面向的穷人并不占多数，我们证明，为了自己的利益，让中产阶级随机受益是有必要的。这种方法模仿了实际的制度安排，中产阶级认为个人可以成功申请该计划。我们考虑一个两阶段的决策过程：首先，罗尔斯政府选择允许中产阶级从给定计划中受益的可能性；然后，多数投票决定收益的水平和贡献率。在第一宪法阶段，政府无法承诺特定水平的税收和利益，但预计第二阶段将由多数投票决定。