This study analyzes the strategic use of public debt. Contrary to the classical view that politicians can use public debt to tie the hands of their successors, we show that an incumbent government can take advantage of having tied its own hands before the election with the help of public debt. By doing this, it reduces the basis for future social conflicts and benefits from social peace during its term, which may enhance its chances of being re-elected. In addition, in the case of foreign or external public debt, the incumbent can strategically divert future social conflicts toward a common enemy (foreign creditors). Thus, by increasing public debt before the election, the incumbent can strengthen social cohesion during his/her mandate, both by reducing the basis of internal conflicts and by diverting citizens from internal toward external rent-seeking activities.

这项研究分析了公共债务的战略用途。与政治家可以利用公共债务束缚其继任者之手的经典观点相反，我们表明，现任政府可以利用选举前借助公共债务束缚自己的双手的优势。通过这样做，它降低了其任期内从社会和平未来的社会矛盾和利益，这可以增强其再次当选机会的基础。此外，在外债或外债的情况下，任职者可以从战略上将未来的社会冲突转移到一个共同的敌人（外国债权人）上。因此，通过增加大选前的公共债务，在位者可以在其任职期间加强社会凝聚力，