This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al. (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68, 123–131, 2017). They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71, 605–619, 2020) and Titelbaum and Hart (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(2), 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and Titelbaum (Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(4), 252–262, 2015) do not undermine the argument of Hawthorne et al. (2017).

本文强调了刘易斯主要原理和某些关于可采性的辅助条件的作用，以阐明合理的正常非正式标准。这些考虑激发了霍桑等人提出的主原则暗示冷漠原则的论点的前提。（英国科学哲学杂志，2017年第68期，第123–131页）。他们还提出了对最近对该论点的批评的回应路线，这要归因于Pettigrew（英国科学哲学期刊，71，605-619，2020）和Titelbaum and Hart（英国科学哲学期刊，71（2） ），621-632，2020年）。该文件还表明，与Hart和Titelbaum（思想：《哲学杂志》（A Journal of Philosophy，4（4），252–262，2015）并不破坏霍桑等人的观点。（2017）。