We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.

中文翻译：

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不受限制的规则，在几乎不受限制的域中具有三种选择

我们考虑一个社会的集体决策问题，该社会在严格的偏好域中从三个选择中选择，其中一个选择的优先次序不可接受。我们提出了顺序帕累托无支配规则族，并将其中之一定性为唯一的完整范围，匿名，仅上层列表和可证明策略的投票规则。