We investigate the effects of fee-shifting in an experimental litigation game. In our setup, a defendant may cause harm to a plaintiff. The defendant can take precautions to lower the probability of harm at a personal cost. In case of harm, the parties go to court, where the winner is determined by a rent-seeking contest. We compare two fee-shifting rules: under the American rule each party bears its own litigation costs; under the English rule the loser has to reimburse the winner’s expenses. We test the hypothesis that the English rule leads to higher litigation spending but also to higher care compared to the American rule. The experimental results largely support the predictions: fee-shifting leads to higher litigation spending, which motivates higher levels of care. When the parties are offered the possibility to settle their dispute out of court, fee-shifting leads to even higher litigation spending in court, but it neither affects the settlement rate nor care.

中文翻译：

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英美规则下的诉讼支出和护理：实验证据

我们调查了费用转移在实验性诉讼游戏中的影响。在我们的设置中，被告可能会对原告造成伤害。被告可以采取预防措施，以个人成本降低伤害的可能性。如果发生损害，双方将上法庭，由寻租竞赛确定获胜者。我们比较了两种费用转移规则：在美国规则下，每一方承担自己的诉讼费用；根据英国规则，输家必须偿还赢家的费用。我们检验了这样的假设，即与美国规则相比，英国规则会导致更高的诉讼支出，但也会导致更高的关注度。实验结果在很大程度上支持了预测：费用转移导致更高的诉讼支出，从而激发更高水平的护理。