Centralized sanctioning in social dilemmas has been shown to increase efficiency with respect to standard decentralized peer punishment. In this context, we explore the impact of sanctioners’ motivations through their payoff scheme, not only on their actions but also on the actions of the monitored individuals. To do so, we compare the implementation of two different payoff schemes for the monitor in a centralized sanctioning framework: (i) a fixed payoff scheme and (ii) a variable payoff scheme contingent on the level of cooperation achieved. We find that providing the sanctioner with a contingent payoff has a negative impact on contributions. This occurs although sanctioners implement more punishment when endowed with this payoff scheme. We argue that differences in contributions are not driven by the punishment strategy, by but the nature of the monitor’s payoff scheme. To support this idea, we run a control treatment where the monitor is a mere “observer” with either a fixed or a contingent payoff. Contributions are still lower when the observer receives a contingent payoff than a fixed payoff. Hence, differences in contributions are, in fact, driven by what we denominate as an indirect free-rider aversion.

事实证明，在社会两难困境中实行集中制裁可以提高标准下放同伴惩罚的效率。在这种情况下，我们通过制裁者的回报方案来探索制裁者动机的影响，不仅对制裁者的行为，而且也对受监视个人的行为产生影响。为此，我们在集中制裁框架中比较了监控程序的两种不同收益方案的实施情况：（i）固定收益方案和（ii）可变收益方案，取决于达成的合作水平。我们发现，为制裁者提供或有的回报会对缴费产生负面影响。尽管制裁者在获得这种回报方案的情况下会实施更多的惩罚，但仍会发生这种情况。我们认为捐款的差异不是由惩罚策略驱动的，取决于监察员的还款方案的性质。为了支持该想法，我们进行了控制处理，其中监视器只是具有固定或或有收益的“观察者”。当观察者收到或有收益时，贡献仍然低于固定收益。因此，贡献的差异实际上是由我们所称的间接搭便车的厌恶。