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The impact of board characteristics and CEO power on banks’ risk-taking: stable versus crisis periods
Journal of Banking Regulation Pub Date : 2021-03-25 , DOI: 10.1057/s41261-021-00146-4
Catarina Fernandes , Jorge Farinha , Francisco Vitorino Martins , Cesario Mateus

We examine the impact of board structure, CEO power and other bank-specific factors on bank risk-taking for a sample of 72 publicly listed European banks in both stable and crisis periods. Using a simultaneous equations approach, our main findings indicate that the proportion of independent directors, the board size, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power affected bank risk-taking negatively during the recent financial crisis. On the contrary, institutional shareholder ownership and the presence of an ex-CEO as Chairman influenced bank risk-taking positively. Additionally, we separately analyse stable and crisis periods and observe that in the pre-crisis period only board independence and institutional ownership keep the same impact on risk while CEO power has no influence and the existence of an ex-CEO as Chairman reduces risk-taking by banks. We conclude that different governance characteristics have different relevance for banks' risk-taking contingent on the economic environment being one of stability or crisis.



中文翻译:

董事会特征和首席执行官权力对银行承担风险的影响:稳定与危机时期

我们以稳定和危机时期的72家欧洲上市银行为样本,研究了董事会结构,首席执行官权力和其他银行特定因素对银行冒险行为的影响。使用联立方程法,我们的主要发现表明,在最近的金融危机期间,独立董事的比例,董事会规模和首席执行官(CEO)的权力对银行的冒险行为产生了负面影响。相反,机构股东的所有权和前任首席执行官的出任对银行承担风险产生了积极的影响。此外,我们分别分析了稳定期和危机期,并观察到在危机前期,只有董事会独立性和机构所有权对风险具有相同的影响,而CEO的权力没有影响,而前任CEO作为董事长的存在会降低风险承担由银行。

更新日期:2021-03-25
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