The article considers the recent case of R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971 and the way in which the courts are deciding to interpret the concept of freedom under s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It is argued that the case shines a light upon the lacuna present in the Act with regards to deception and consent, identified by academics when the Act was promulgated. It is suggested that the definition of consent lacks clarity as courts have struggled in its application. The resulting ‘so closely connected’ test developed in the cases of R (on the application of Monica) v DPP [2018] EWHC 3508 (Admin); [2019] QB 1019 and R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971 is not an adequate solution to the problem of deception and consent and potentially muddies the waters further. The article offers a potential solution that might better uphold the ambition of protecting sexual autonomy while adhering to the concept of fair-labelling.

本文考虑了R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971一案的最新情况，以及法院决定根据s解释自由概念的方式。《 2003年性犯罪法》第74条。有人认为，此案为该法颁布之时的学者们发现了该法中存在的关于欺骗和同意的空白。建议说，由于法院在申请书的适用方面存在困难，因此同意书的定义不够明确。在R（根据Monica的申请）诉DPP [2018] EWHC 3508（Admin）的案例中，开发了由此产生的“紧密联系”的测试；[2019] QB 1019和R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971这并不是解决欺骗和同意问题的适当解决方案，并有可能进一步使局势更加混乱。本文提供了一种可能的解决方案，它可能会在坚持公平标签概念的同时更好地维护保护性自主的野心。