According to James K.A. Smith, contemporary epistemology is overly focused on the noetic. Smith offers a counter-epistemology drawn from pentecostal spirituality that is narrative, affective, and embodied. Richard Davis and Paul Franks criticize this model and argue that it succumbs to story-relativism and arbitrariness. This article defends Smith against their critiques through three steps. First, it exposits Smith’s narrative, affective epistemology in order to identify areas that are relevant to their critiques. Second, it outlines and analyzes their critiques, reveals areas in which they fundamentally misunderstand Smith, and presents their commitment to epistemological objectivism. Finally, utilizing Alvin Plantinga’s externalist warrant model, it argues that Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology can assist Smith’s epistemology in consistent ways. If the following argument is successful, then Smith’s postmodern pentecostal epistemology can be reimagined as an externalist epistemology that overcomes the charges of relativism and arbitrariness.

根据詹姆斯·卡·史密斯（James KA Smith）的观点，当代认识论过于关注观念论。史密斯提供了一种从五旬节式灵性汲取的反叙事学，它具有叙事性，情感性和体现性。理查德·戴维斯（Richard Davis）和保罗·弗兰克斯（Paul Franks）批评了这种模式，并认为这种模式屈从于故事相对论和任意性。本文通过三个步骤来捍卫史密斯，使其免受批评。首先，它阐述了史密斯的叙事，情感认识论，以便确定与其批评有关的领域。其次，它概述并分析了他们的批评，揭示了他们从根本上误解了史密斯的领域，并表达了他们对认识论客观主义的承诺。最后，利用阿尔文·普林丁加的外在主义保证模型，认为普林丁加的改革认识论可以以一致的方式帮助史密斯的认识论。