In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility. Our model features a finite number of agents whose information is exclusive, whom we shall term “monopolists of scarce information.” When the number of agents with exclusive information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information.

中文翻译：

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大型准线性经济体中信息稀缺和群体有效性的垄断者

在大型拟线性经济中，我们提供了充分的条件来建立具有内生性通信的几种近似临时核心版本的非空性。这是通过证明满足激励兼容性的近似事后核心的非空性来完成的。我们的模型具有有限数量的代理人，这些代理人的信息是专有的，我们将其称为“稀缺信息的垄断者”。当具有排他信息的代理商数量保持有限时，主要论点依赖于先前针对完整信息博弈提出的小团体有效性条件的调整。