This paper studies the design of position auctions when bidders have multi-unit demands for advertising positions. I propose an ascending clock auction with two stages: allocation stage and assignment stage. The allocation stage determines the quantity of positions assigned to each advertiser using a generalized version of the Ausubel (2004) auction under the context of differentiated items. The assignment stage determines the ranking of advertisements using a generalized version of the generalized English auction under the context of multi-unit demands. I show that this two-stage ascending clock auction dynamically implements the VCG outcome in an ex post perfect equilibrium under pure private values.

本文研究了当投标人对广告职位有多单位需求时的头寸拍卖设计。我提出了一个上升时钟拍卖，分为两个阶段：分配阶段和分配阶段。分配阶段使用Ausubel（2004）拍卖的广义版本，根据差异项目确定分配给每个广告商的职位数量。在多单元需求的情况下，分配阶段使用广义英语拍卖的广义版本来确定广告的排名。我表明，此两阶段上升时钟拍卖在纯私有价值下以事后完美均衡动态地实现了VCG结果。