ABSTRACT

I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpressible properties, but its formulation presupposes the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. I discuss some ways to reduce these existence assumptions, but ultimately suggest that deflationists can hardly avoid quantification over abstract objects of one sort or another. I conclude that property deflationism is perhaps not as deflationary as some philosophers want it to be, but that it’s still apt to call the position ‘deflationary’.

摘要

我批判性地研究了一些关于属性的通货紧缩理论，根据这些理论，属性是“谓词的影子”，对它们的量化只是一种准逻辑功能。我首先考虑霍夫韦伯的内在主义理论，并为他对不可表达属性的解释提出一个问题。然后我介绍了一种与霍维奇的极简主义真理理论非常相似的属性理论。该理论克服了无法表达的特性的问题，但其表述以各种抽象对象的存在为前提。我讨论了一些减少这些存在假设的方法，但最终表明，紧缩论者很难避免对一种或另一种抽象对象进行量化。我的结论是，财产紧缩主义可能不像一些哲学家想要的那样紧缩，