Intellectual attention, such as perceptual attention, is a special mode of mental engagement with the world. When we attend intellectually, rather than making use of sensory information we make use of the kind of information that shows up in occurrent thought, memory, and the imagination. In this paper, I argue that reflecting on what it is like to comprehend memory demonstratives speaks in favor of the view that intellectual attention is required to understand memory demonstratives. Moreover, I argue that this is a line of thought endorsed by Gareth Evans in his Varieties of Reference. In so doing, I improve on interpretations of Evans that have been offered by Christopher Peacocke and Christoph Hoerl & Theresa McCormack. In so doing, I also improve on McDowell's criticism of Peacocke's interpretation of Evans. Like McDowell, I believe that Peacocke might overemphasize the role that “memory images” play in Evans’ account of comprehending memory demonstratives. But unlike McDowell, I provide a positive characterization of how Evans described the phenomenology of comprehending memory demonstratives.

中文翻译：

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埃文斯关于智力注意力和记忆力的示范

智力关注，如知觉关注，是一种与世界进行心理接触的特殊模式。当我们在智力上参与时，我们不是利用感官信息，而是利用出现在发生的思想、记忆和想象中的那种信息。在本文中，我认为反思理解记忆指示词的感觉支持这样一种观点，即理解记忆指示词需要智力关注。此外，我认为这是加雷斯·埃文斯在他的各种参考文献中认可的思路。通过这样做，我改进了 Christopher Peacocke 和 Christoph Hoerl & Theresa McCormack 对 Evans 的解释。这样做，我也改进了麦克道尔对皮科克对埃文斯的解释的批评。像麦克道尔一样，我相信皮科克可能过分强调“记忆意象”在埃文斯对理解记忆指示词的解释中所起的作用。但与麦克道尔不同的是，我对埃文斯如何描述理解记忆指示的现象学提供了积极的描述。