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CEO pay disparity, takeover premiums and bidder performance in Australia: efficient contracting or managerial power?
Accounting & Finance ( IF 2.473 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-23 , DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12784
Hoa Luong 1 , Lien Duong 2 , John Evans 3
Affiliation  

We compare acquiring firms’ CEO pay with that of the highest-paid non-CEO director and investigate the influence of CEO pay disparity on takeover premiums and bidder performance. Based on a takeover sample of Australian listed targets and bidders during the 2002–2015 period, we find that takeover premiums are significantly higher if the deals are processed by acquiring firms with higher CEO pay disparity. Although these firms do not receive favourable immediate market responses to their takeover announcements, they outperform in the long run. We find no evidence that offering a large takeover premium harms shareholders’ wealth. Overall, our findings largely support efficient contracting theory in the Australian M&A context.

中文翻译:

澳大利亚首席执行官薪酬差距、收购溢价和投标人绩效:有效的合同或管理权力?

我们将收购公司的 CEO 薪酬与薪酬最高的非 CEO 董事的薪酬进行比较,并调查 CEO 薪酬差异对收购溢价和投标人绩效的影响。根据 2002 年至 2015 年期间澳大利亚上市目标和投标人的收购样本,我们发现如果交易由首席执行官薪酬差距较大的收购公司处理,收购溢价会显着提高。尽管这些公司的收购公告并未立即获得有利的市场反应,但从长远来看,它们的表现优于其他公司。我们没有发现任何证据表明提供高额收购溢价会损害股东的财富。总体而言,我们的研究结果在很大程度上支持澳大利亚并购背景下的有效合同理论。
更新日期:2021-03-23
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