This paper studies optimal allocation of control rights in collective organizations where members are heterogeneous across their opportunity costs and knowledgeability (expertise). Three results are established. First, members’ heterogeneity is costly as it makes communication coarse and hampers decision making. Second, efficient allocation of control rights entails granting the decision rights to the members who are more (less) inclined to implement projects when the market is (not) ripe with profitable projects. This result, however, requires that members with the control rights are highly knowledgeable. Third, governance structure determines who bears the cost of heterogeneity, whereas the market determines who benefits from it. Members shouldering the costs should be compensated to be willing to join the collective organization. Governance structure and the market are therefore intertwined. Consequently, efficient allocation of control rights might not be viable. One implication is that it is unlikely that junior members have decision authority in heterogeneous partnerships. Another implication is that the viability of collective entrepreneurships is problematic in many settings.

本文研究了集体组织中控制权的最佳分配，这种组织的成员在机会成本和知识（技能）方面是异类的。建立了三个结果。首先，成员的异质性代价高昂，因为这会使沟通变得粗糙，并妨碍决策。其次，控制权的有效分配需要将决策权授予在市场（不是）充满盈利项目的条件下更（较少）倾向于实施项目的成员。但是，此结果要求具有控制权的成员具有很高的知识。第三，治理结构决定谁承担异质性成本，而市场决定谁从异质性中受益。承担费用的成员应该得到补偿，愿意加入集体组织。因此，治理结构和市场是交织在一起的。因此，控制权的有效分配可能不可行。一种暗示是，下级成员不太可能在异类合伙企业中拥有决策权。另一个含义是集体企业家精神的生存能力在许多情况下都是有问题的。