We examine the value implications of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis for a sample of Australian listed companies. Consistent with the US evidence in Masulis, R, C Wang and F Xie (2009). Agency problems at dual-class companies. Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1697–1727, we find that the marginal value of corporate capital expenditures in Australian listed companies is inversely related to the magnitude of agency conflicts arising out of the use of free cash flows. Our results suggest that firms where managers have a greater ability to extract private benefits and are therefore more likely to maximize their own private benefits rather than shareholder wealth will suffer from a lower perceived valuation of their capital investments. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies for relative cash flows and growth opportunities and also hold over multiple sub-periods and industry groupings.

中文翻译：

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代理冲突与澳大利亚上市公司资本支出的边际价值

我们研究了 Jensen 的自由现金流假设对澳大利亚上市公司样本的价值影响。与 Masulis、R、C Wang 和 F Xie (2009) 中的美国证据一致。双级公司的代理问题。Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1697–1727，我们发现澳大利亚上市公司的企业资本支出边际价值与使用自由现金流引起的代理冲突的大小成反比。我们的研究结果表明，如果公司的管理者有更大的能力提取私人利益，因此更有可能最大化他们自己的私人利益而不是股东财富，他们的资本投资的感知估​​值会降低。