This paper examines the association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment. We find that the level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the tangible long-lived assets impairment charges. We also document that in firms with CEOs who have more decision-making power, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is mitigated. Specifically, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is less pronounced (1) when CEO chairs the board, (2) when CEO is the founder of the firm, (3) when the CEO is involved in the director selection process, and (4) when overall board independence is low.

中文翻译：

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CEO 权力是否会影响 CEO 薪酬与有形资产减值之间的关联？

本文研究了 CEO 薪酬与有形长期资产减值之间的关联。我们发现 CEO 薪酬水平与有形长期资产减值费用呈负相关。我们还发现，在 CEO 拥有更多决策权的公司中，CEO 薪酬与有形长期资产减值费用之间的负相关关系得到缓解。具体而言，CEO 薪酬与有形长期资产减值费用之间的负相关关系不太明显（1）当 CEO 担任董事会主席时，（2）当 CEO 是公司的创始人时，（3）当 CEO 参与董事选择过程，以及 (4) 当整体董事会独立性较低时。