The most evident shortcoming of the international agreements on climate actions is the compliance to their prescriptions. Can John Rawls’s social contract theory help us to solve the problem? We apply the veil of ignorance decision-making setting in a sequential dictator game to study the compliance to climate change agreements and we test the model in a laboratory experiment. The veil of ignorance shows to be very powerful at inducing the subjects to converge on a sustainable intergenerational path. However, the voluntary compliance to the agreement still remains an open issue, because even small incentives to defect can undermine the compliance stability, and therefore break the whole sustainable dynamic.

国际气候行动协定的最明显缺点是遵守其规定。约翰·罗尔斯的社会契约论理论可以帮助我们解决问题吗？我们在无序的独裁者游戏中应用无知决策面纱，以研究对气候变化协议的遵守情况，并在实验室实验中测试该模型。无知的面纱显示出非常强大的力量，可以诱使受试者融合到可持续的代际道路上。但是，自愿遵守协议仍然是一个悬而未决的问题，因为即使是很小的缺陷诱因也会破坏遵守的稳定性，从而破坏了整个可持续发展的动力。