In this paper, I defend a novel skeptical view about moral disgust. I argue that much recent discussion of moral disgust neglects an important ontological question: is there a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust that is differentiable from generic disgust, and from other psychological states? I investigate the ontological question and propose two conditions that any aspiring account of moral disgust must satisfy: (1) it must be a genuine form of disgust, and (2) it must be genuinely moral. Next, I examine two prominent accounts of moral disgust by John Kekes and Victor Kumar and argue that neither successfully establishes the existence of genuinely moral disgust: Kekes’ account does not satisfy condition (2), and Kumar’s view does not meet condition (1). I claim that an important general lesson can be drawn from my critiques of Kekes’ and Kumar’s accounts: to establish the existence of moral disgust, one must provide unequivocal evidence that genuinely moral disgust, not generic disgust or anger, is being elicited in response to relevant moral violations. I conclude by considering why we ought to be skeptical about the general prospect of giving a positive answer to the ontological question, given the available evidence.

在本文中，我捍卫了一种关于道德厌恶的新颖怀疑论观点。我认为，最近关于道德厌恶的讨论忽略了一个重要的本体论问题：道德存在一种独特的心理状态吗？与一般的厌恶和其他心理状态有区别的厌恶？我研究本体论问题，并提出了两个有抱负的道德厌恶要求必须满足的两个条件：（1）它必须是一种真正的厌恶形式，（2）它必须是真正的道德。接下来，我研究了约翰·科克斯和维克多·库马尔的两个关于道德厌恶的著名说法，并认为这两个论点都没有成功地证明存在真正的道德厌恶：科克斯的言辞不满足条件（2），而库马尔的观点不满足条件（1）。 。我声称可以从我对Kekes和Kumar的论述的批判中得出一个重要的一般性教训：要确立道德厌恶的存在，必须明确地证明真正的道德厌恶，而不是普遍的厌恶或愤怒，是为了回应相关的道德违规行为而引起的。最后，我考虑了为什么在给定的证据的情况下，为什么我们应该对对本体论问题给出肯定答案的总体前景持怀疑态度。