In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic. The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant.

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黑格尔的逻辑和自然生活

在这篇文章中，我将讨论黑格尔对生命和有机体的解释在第三次批判中康德对自然目的的解释的具体方式。. 首先，我认为对于黑格尔的解释来说，它包含两个层次是必不可少的。第一层是逻辑生命，其讨论不依赖于任何自然有机体的经验知识。我提供了我对生活的这种逻辑描述的重构，它回答了许多黑格尔学者提出的反对意见，即黑格尔实际上在逻辑的这个地方依赖于经验知识。第二个层次是自然有机体本身。我认为，正是借助这种逻辑和自然层次的分离，以及他关于自然无能为力的学说，黑格尔与康德不同，(a) 能够声称自然有机体中的一切并非都是有目的的，和（b）提供了一个哲学的，而不仅仅是经验的，对植物和动物之间的区别的解释。