This paper highlights the dark side of power imbalance regarding its consequences in agri-food supplier–buyer relationships. We report on findings from two studies. The first study is based on a sample of 105 key informants, while study 2 is based on a sample of 444 key informants, all from the cocoa agri-food supply market of Ghana. While the first study focuses on the antecedents of power imbalance and its consequences, the second study explores the role of cooperatives/collective action in minimizing supplier exploitation. Data from these studies were analysed using the partial least squares technique (SmartPLS). Analysis of these findings shows switching costs’ impact on power imbalance to be curvilinear, while power imbalance has a curvilinear relationship with opportunism. The negative consequences of power imbalance are further exacerbated by dependency and the lack of joint action. Furthermore, we found the negative impact of power imbalance on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members, while, counterintuitively, we found the positive impact of economic satisfaction on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members.

本文强调了权力不平衡对农业食品供应商-买方关系的影响的阴暗面。我们报告了两项研究的结果。第一项研究基于 105 名关键知情人的样本，而研究 2 基于 444 名关键知情人的样本，全部来自加纳可可农业食品供应市场。虽然第一项研究侧重于权力不平衡的前因及其后果，但第二项研究探讨了合作社/集体行动在最大限度地减少供应商剥削中的作用。使用偏最小二乘技术 (SmartPLS) 分析了这些研究的数据。对这些发现的分析表明，转换成本对权力不平衡的影响是曲线的，而权力不平衡与机会主义具有曲线关系。依赖和缺乏联合行动进一步加剧了权力不平衡的负面后果。此外，我们发现权力失衡对财务绩效的负面影响对非合作成员比合作成员更强，而与直觉相反，我们发现经济满意度对财务绩效的积极影响对非合作成员比合作成员更强为合作社成员。