Using two experiments, I examine how apologizing for fraud influences investor's avoidance (selling shares) and revenge (litigation) behavior. Investors in experiment one report how many shares they would sell and how likely they would be to pursue legal punishment after discovering fraud has occurred in an organization they are currently invested in and subsequently reading about management's response to the fraud. I manipulate the nature of fraud as fraudulent financial reporting (misreporting) or asset misappropriation (embezzlement). I also manipulate whether management apologizes, scapegoats responsibility, or remains silent after the fraud. Results show avoidance and revenge behavior is more negative after misreporting fraud. Data suggest that this difference may be partially attributable to the underlying moral norm that is violated. Specifically, misreporting is primarily a moral violation of deception, whereas embezzlement is primarily a moral violation of stealing. Results also show differential investor reactions depending on the type of fraud and management's response. For misreporting, revenge behavior is higher when management apologizes, but there is no effect on avoidance behavior. For embezzlement, avoidance behavior is reduced when the organization apologizes, but revenge behavior is unaffected. In experiment two, I replicate the misreporting condition from experiment one and manipulate apology sincerity. Results show that apology sincerity is positively associated with revenge behavior. Results of these two experiments extend both accounting and trust repair research by emphasizing the importance of disentangling moral integrity-based trust violations and that the adage of "just say you're sorry" is helpful in some situations and harmful in others.

通过两个实验，我研究了为欺诈道歉如何影响投资者的回避（卖出股票）和复仇（诉讼）行为。实验一的投资者报告说，他们发现要投资的组织中发生欺诈行为后，将出售多少股票，以及将有多大可能受到法律制裁，并随后了解管理层对欺诈行为的回应。我操纵欺诈的性质为欺诈性财务报告（虚假报告）或资产挪用（盗用）。我还操纵管理层在道歉后是否道歉，替罪羊或保持沉默。结果表明，在误报欺诈行为之后，回避行为和复仇行为更为负面。数据表明，这种差异可能部分归因于被违反的基本道德规范。具体而言，误报主要是对欺骗的道德违背，而贪污罪主要是对盗窃的道德违背。结果还显示，投资者的反应取决于欺诈的类型和管理层的反应。对于误报，当管理层道歉时，复仇行为较高，但对回避行为没有影响。对于挪用公款，当组织道歉时，回避行为会减少，但复仇行为不会受到影响。在实验二中，我从实验一中复制了误报情况，并道歉道歉。结果表明，道歉的诚意与报仇行为成正相关。