Newcomb’s problem involves a decision-maker faced with a choice and a predictor forecasting this choice. The agents’ interaction seems to generate a choice dilemma once the decision-maker seeks to apply two basic principles of rational choice theory (RCT): maximize expected utility (MEU); adopt the dominant strategy (ADS). We review unsuccessful attempts at pacifying the dilemma by excluding Newcomb’s problem as an RCT-application, by restricting MEU and ADS, and by allowing for backward causation. A probability approach shows that Newcomb’s original problem-formulation lacks causal information. This makes it impossible to specify the probability structure of Newcomb’s univocally. Once missing information is added, Newcomb’s problem and RCT re-align, thus explaining Newcomb’s problem as a seeming dilemma. Building on Wolpert and Benford (Synthese 190(9):1637–1646, 2013), we supply additional details and offer a crucial correction to their formal proof.

纽科姆的问题涉及决策者面临的选择和预测此选择的预测器。一旦决策者寻求运用理性选择理论（RCT）的两个基本原理，代理商的互动似乎会产生选择困境。采用主导策略（ADS）。我们通过排除纽康问题作为RCT应用程序，限制MEU和ADS以及允许向后因果关系，来解决了解决两难困境的未成功尝试。概率方法表明，纽康的原始问题公式缺乏因果关系信息。这使得不可能唯一地指定纽康的概率结构。一旦添加了缺少的信息，纽康的问题和RCT就会重新对齐，从而将纽康的问题解释为看似两难的境地。