This article has two main aims. First, it will defend an ‘attitudinal’ account of pleasure, that is, an account of what it is that makes an experience pleasurable for a subject that explains it in terms of a certain kind of de re desire that the subject has towards that experience. Second, in doing so, the article aims to further our understanding of unconscious desires, and of what the subjects of such desires can be. The article begins by introducing two existing accounts of what makes an experience pleasurable. It then offers a diagnosis of a recent objection to attitudinal accounts from Bramble and existing responses from attitudinal theorists, arguing that the two positions are currently at a stalemate. After this, I argue for the possible existence of unknowable and unconscious de re desires, and show how such desires provide the best defence of such ‘attitudinal’ accounts.

中文翻译：

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快感和欲望的态度理论

本文有两个主要目的。首先，它将捍卫一种对快乐的“态度”解释，也就是说，是什么使主体感到愉悦，而主体则用某种特定的方式来解释它。德雷主体对这种体验的渴望。其次，在这样做的过程中，本文旨在加深我们对无意识欲望的理解，以及这种欲望的主体可能是什么。这篇文章首先介绍了两个现有的关于什么使体验愉快的说法。然后，它对最近对 Bramble 态度描述的反对意见和态度理论家的现有回应做出了诊断，认为这两个立场目前处于僵局。在此之后，我论证了不可知和无意识的可能存在德雷欲望，并展示这种欲望如何为这种“态度”叙述提供最好的辩护。