Appointing a United Nations (UN) mediator to work in tandem with the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964 led to fundamental shifts in how the UN Secretariat inner circle orientated the organisation’s presence in Cyprus. The escalating crisis between the two communities in Cyprus and political pressure from UN member states to respond before Cold War superpower nations became engulfed, prompted the creation of UNFICYP and the recruitment of a UN mediator on 4 March 1964. This article argues that the UN leadership intended to restore member state trust following the controversial Congo mission (ONUC) and expand the organisation’s diplomatic agency through the innovation of deploying the dedicated mediator alongside the armed mission. However, the success of the meditator was diplomatically limited by the localised dynamics of the Cyprus conflict and the willingness of the Guarantor parties to surrender their sovereign imaginaries of post-colonial Cyprus. Ultimately, the experiment in field-based mediation forced the UN Secretariat leadership to acknowledge the incompatibility of appeasing all member states on one hand whilst leading field-based political negotiations with the other.

中文翻译：

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（绿色）线上的声誉：重新审视联合国维和实践中的“广场时刻”，1964-1966

1964 年 3 月任命一名联合国 (UN) 调解员与联合国驻塞浦路斯部队 (UNFICYP) 合作，导致联合国秘书处核心圈子如何定位该组织在塞浦路斯的存在发生了根本性转变。1964 年 3 月 4 日，塞浦路斯两个社区之间不断升级的危机以及联合国成员国在冷战超级大国被吞没之前做出回应的政治压力促使联塞部队成立并招募了一名联合国调解员。本文认为，联合国领导层旨在通过有争议的刚果特派团（ONUC）恢复成员国的信任，并通过在武装特派团旁边部署专门的调解员的创新来扩大该组织的外交机构。然而，冥想者的成功在外交上受到塞浦路斯冲突的局部动态以及担保方放弃其对后殖民塞浦路斯的主权想象的意愿的限制。最终，实地调解实验迫使联合国秘书处领导层承认一方面安抚所有成员国，另一方面领导实地政治谈判是不相容的。