Whereas the active role of the state in steering financialization is consensual in advanced economies, the financialization of emerging market economies is usually examined through the prism of dependency: this downplays the domestic political functions of financialization and the agency of the state. With the consolidation of state capitalist regimes in the semi-periphery after the Global Financial Crisis, different interpretations emerged – some linking state capitalism with de-financialization, others with coercive projects deepening it. Preferring a more granular and multi-dimensional approach, I analyse how different facets of financialization might represent political risks or opportunities for state capitalist projects: Based on the Hungarian example, I first explain how the constitution of a ‘financial vertical’ after 2010 inaugurated a new mode of statecraft. Second, I show how the financial vertical enabled rentier bargains between state and society after 2015 by deepening the financialization of social policy and housing in response to a looming crisis of competitiveness.

在发达经济体中，国家在引导金融化中的积极作用是公认的，而新兴市场经济体的金融化通常是通过依赖的角度来考察的：这低估了金融化的国内政治功能和国家机构的作用。随着全球金融危机之后半边缘国家资本主义政权的巩固，出现了不同的解释-一些将国家资本主义与非金融化联系起来，另一些与强制性项目加深了联系。我更喜欢一种更细粒度和多维的方法，我分析了金融化的不同方面可能如何代表国家资本主义项目的政治风险或机遇：基于匈牙利的例子，我首先解释一下2010年以后的“金融垂直领域”的组织形式如何开创了一种新的治国方略。其次，我将展示金融垂直市场如何通过深化社会政策和住房的金融化以应对迫在眉睫的竞争力危机，从而在2015年后实现国家和社会之间的食利者讨价还价。