This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.

本文研究了詹姆斯·科南特所称的康德式怀疑论与笛卡尔式怀疑论变体之间的关系。有人认为，可以在威尔弗里德·塞拉斯 (Wilfrid Sellars) 的作品中找到对康德式怀疑论最突出例子的解决方案，即关于遵循规则和意义的克里普肯斯坦式怀疑论。然后有人认为，基于对康德的规则遵循和意义问题的完全相同的解决方案，可以制定一个反对外部世界怀疑论的新论点。这种论证采取了先验论证的形式，这让人想起希拉里·普特南 (Hilary Putnam) 反对缸中脑假说的臭名昭著的论证，但正如所论证的那样，在某些方面优于它。