The paper focuses on the problem of how to account for the phenomena of disagreement and retraction in disputes over skepticism in a contextualist framework. I will argue that nonindexical versions of contextualism are better suited to account for those phenomena than DeRose’s indexical form of contextualism. Furthermore, I will argue against DeRose’s “single scoreboard” semantics and against his solution of ruling that in a dispute over skepticism, both parties to the conversation are expressing something truth-valueless. At the end, I will briefly address the question of whether DeRose’s contextualism combined with his double-safety account and his rule of sensitivity provide an epistemically satisfying answer to the skeptical challenge. It will be argued that by merely explaining (away) the attractiveness of skeptical arguments, DeRose’s contextualism seems to lack the resources to explain some important epistemic issues, as, for example, the question of what knowledge is and when a true belief turns into knowledge.

本文关注的问题是如何在情境主义框架下解决怀疑论争中的分歧和退缩现象。我会争辩说，非索引与DeRose的索引主义形式的上下文主义相比，上下文主义的版本更适合解决这些现象。此外，我将反对DeRose的“单一记分牌”语义，并反对他的裁决解决方案，即在怀疑论争中，对话双方都在表达某种毫无价值的事实。最后，我将简要讨论DeRose的情境主义，他的双重安全说明和他的敏感度规则是否为怀疑主义的挑战提供了认识上令人满意的答案的问题。有人认为，仅通过解释（消除）怀疑论点的吸引力，德罗斯的情境主义似乎缺乏资源来解释一些重要的认识论问题，例如，关于什么是知识的问题以及何时将真正的信念转化为知识的问题。 。