ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the issue of how to best account for the diversity of our (synchronic) mental activities. The discussion starts with Mark Textor’s mental monism. According to mental monism, our mental life is constituted by just one simple mental act, in which different sub-acts can be conceptually distinguished. Textor grounds this view in the work of the early Brentano and contrasts it with the theory of the later Brentano, who introduces a mental substance into his philosophy. According to Textor, Brentano needs a substance because he is unable to explain how mental monism can account for the separability of our mental activities, e.g. the fact that I can stop hearing F while still seeing blue. Textor argues, however, that mental monism can solve this problem. I address two issues regarding Textor’s view. First, I challenge his interpretation of Brentano by arguing that the early Brentano imports ontological complexity into our mental life; I defend Brentano’s view against possible criticisms, and I address some objections to mental monism. Second, I oppose Textor’s narrative about the mental substance. I argue that Brentano needs a substance not to explain separability, but rather to individuate our mental acts. I still argue, however, that Brentano’s earlier view (understood in my sense) is better than the substance account for dividing the mind.

摘要

本文解决了如何最好地解释我们（同步）心理活动的多样性的问题。讨论从马克·泰克斯特的心理一元论开始。根据心理一元论，我们的心理生活仅由一个简单的心理活动构成，其中可以在概念上区分不同的子活动。特克斯特将这一观点建立在早期布伦塔诺的著作中，并将其与后来的布伦塔诺的理论进行了对比，后者在他的哲学中引入了精神实质。根据 Textor 的说法，布伦塔诺需要一种物质，因为他无法解释心理一元论如何解释我们心理活动的可分离性，例如我可以在看到蓝色的同时停止听到 F 的事实。然而，特克斯特认为，心理一元论可以解决这个问题。我针对 Textor 的观点提出两个问题。第一的，我们的精神生活存在着本体论的复杂性；我捍卫布伦塔诺的观点，反对可能的批评，并提出了对心理一元论的一些反对意见。其次，我反对特克斯特关于精神实质的叙述。我认为布伦塔诺需要一种物质，不是为了解释可分离性，而是为了个体化我们的心理行为。然而，我仍然认为，布伦塔诺早期的观点（以我的理解）比分裂思想的实质解释更好。