Watsuji is recognised as one Japan’s foremost philosophers. His work on ethics, Rinrigaku, is cosmopolitan in engaging the Western philosophical tradition, and in presupposing an international audience. Yet Watsuji’s ethical thought is largely of niche interest outside Japan, and it is critiqued on the ground that it ratifies totalitarianism, demanding individuals’ unquestioning subordination to communal demands. We offer a reading of Rinrigaku that, in attempting to trace the text’s intention, disputes these arguments. We argue that Rinrigaku makes individual autonomy central to ethical action, despite the fact that its treatment of coercion may lead one to think otherwise; that it does not reduce ethical obligations to whatever demands any given society imposes on its members; that it draws a distinction between socio-ethical orders that are genuinely ethical and those that are not; and that, in insisting on the grounding of individuals in the Absolute, it makes adequate room for individuals’ resistance to unjustifiable socio-ethical demands.

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Watsuji的Rinrigaku的关键恢复

Watsuji被公认为日本最重要的哲学家之一。他的伦理学著作 Rinrigaku 在融入西方哲学传统和预设国际观众方面具有国际性。然而，Watsuji 的伦理思想在日本以外的地方主要是小众利益，它被批评的理由是它批准了极权主义，要求个人毫无疑问地服从公共要求。我们提供了对 Rinrigaku 的解读，在试图追溯文本的意图时，对这些论点提出了异议。我们认为，Rinrigaku 将个人自治作为道德行动的核心，尽管它对强制的处理可能会导致人们产生不同的想法；它不会将道德义务降低到任何特定社会对其成员施加的任何要求；它区分了真正符合伦理的社会伦理秩序和不符合伦理的社会伦理秩序；而且，在坚持个人以绝对为基础的过程中，它为个人抵抗不合理的社会伦理要求提供了足够的空间。