The challenge of Gilbert Harman that there are no moral facts is robust, to an extent extreme and counts most for the realists underline moral facts and moral explanations. The paper begins with the absorbing challenge posed by Harman that ends in some sort of skepticism. After a brief exposition of nature of moral facts, the paper focuses on another interesting squabble whether or not we conceive of serious moral explanation that bridges the gap between theories/ principles, and our moral observations. In a separate section it has been shown that moral explanations are far too necessary for moral facts because moral facts need to have explanatory potency. Moral facts need to explain our observations of moral phenomena. The contentious issue has been addressed remarkably well by Nicholas Sturgeon and Brad Majors. I have a suggestion that cogency of ideas of moral facts and moral explanations depend among other things, on the conception of possible worlds.

吉尔伯特·哈曼 (Gilbert Harman) 提出的不存在道德事实的挑战是强有力的，在某种程度上，对于强调道德事实和道德解释的现实主义者来说，这是最极端和最重要的。这篇论文以哈曼提出的引人入胜的挑战开始，以某种怀疑结束。在简要说明道德事实的性质之后，本文将重点放在另一个有趣的争论上，即我们是否构想出严肃的道德解释来弥合理论/原则与我们的道德观察之间的差距。在一个单独的部分中已经表明，道德解释对于道德事实来说太必要了，因为道德事实需要具有解释效力。道德事实需要解释我们对道德现象的观察。Nicholas Sturgeon 和 Brad Majors 已经很好地解决了这个有争议的问题。