Robert Adams defends a platonic account of goodness, understood as excellence, claiming that there exists a platonic good that all other good things must resemble, identifying the Good with God. Mark Murphy agrees, but argues that this platonic account is in need of Aristotelian supplementation, as resemblance must take into account a thing’s kind-membership. While this article will accept something like Murphy’s account of goodness (but without claiming the platonic good is God), it will further develop its details and support. Without relying on theistic premises, I show that the metaphysical status of an individual’s goodness consists in resemblance with the platonic good. As for the distinct question of what that goodness holds in virtue of, I conclude it holds in virtue of exactly: the thing’s own properties, those properties being such as to satisfy its kind-based standards (K-standards), and those K-standards resembling the platonic good. I then develop an account of how K-standards resemble the platonic good: The K-standards resemble it firstly with respect to requiring activities, as the platonic good will be posited to be active, and must resemble it secondly also at the level of what teleology those activities are directed towards. I also motivate the need for a third respect of resemblance, to be developed in future work. The article ends with a discussion of the nature of the platonic good.

罗伯特·亚当斯（Robert Adams）捍卫柏拉图式的良善，被理解为卓越，声称存在一种柏拉图式的善，所有其他善事物都必须相似，将善与上帝联系起来。马克墨菲同意，但认为这个柏拉图式的描述需要亚里士多德的补充，因为相似性必须考虑到事物的善良成员。虽然本文将接受墨菲对善的描述（但不声称柏拉图式的善是上帝），但它将进一步发展其细节和支持。在不依赖有神论前提的情况下，我表明个人善的形而上学状态在于与柏拉图式的善的相似性。至于善凭什么这个独特的问题，我得出的结论是它完全凭着：事物自身的属性，这些属性满足其基于种类的标准（K 标准），以及类似于柏拉图式善的 K 标准。然后我开发了一个关于 K 标准如何与柏拉图式物品相似的说明：K 标准首先在要求活动方面与它相似，因为柏拉图式物品将被假定为是主动的，其次也必须在什么水平上相似这些活动所针对的目的论。我还激发了对相似性的第三个方面的需求，以在未来的工作中发展。文章以对柏拉图式善的性质的讨论结束。因为柏拉图式的善将被假定为是主动的，并且其次也必须在这些活动所针对的目的论层面上与它相似。我还激发了对相似性的第三个方面的需求，以在未来的工作中发展。文章以对柏拉图式善的性质的讨论结束。因为柏拉图式的善将被假定为是主动的，并且其次也必须在这些活动所针对的目的论层面上与它相似。我还激发了对相似性的第三个方面的需求，以在未来的工作中发展。文章以对柏拉图式善的性质的讨论结束。