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Good ‘Cat’, Bad ‘Act’
Philosophia Pub Date : 2020-11-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s11406-020-00287-2
Tim Juvshik

A widespread intuition is that words, musical works, and flags are intentionally produced and that they’re abstract types that can have incorrect tokens. But some philosophers, notably Julian Dodd and Nicholas Wolterstorff, think intention-dependence isn’t necessary; tokens just need to have certain relevant intrinsic features to be tokens of a given type. I show how there’s an unappreciated puzzle that arises from these two views: if tokens aren’t intention-dependent and types can admit of correct and incorrect tokens, then some driftwood that washes up and forms what seems like the word ‘cat’ may simultaneously be a misspelling of ‘act’ and innumerable other misspelt words. I consider various ways Dodd and Wolterstorff can respond to this counterintuitive result and argue that biting the bullet, as well as nearby views, are implausible. Thus, they need to give up one of the two commitments, and I argue that requiring the intention-dependence of tokens, rather than the mere possession of certain intrinsic properties, is the best option.

中文翻译:

好“猫”,坏“行为”

一种普遍的直觉是,文字、音乐作品和标志是有意产生的,它们是抽象类型,可能具有不正确的标记。但是一些哲学家,特别是 Julian Dodd 和 Nicholas Wolterstorff,认为意图依赖是不必要的;令牌只需要具有某些相关的内在特征即可成为给定类型的令牌。我展示了如何从这两种观点中产生一个未被重视的难题:如果标记不依赖于意图并且类型可以承认正确和不正确的标记,那么一些被冲刷并形成看起来像“猫”这个词的浮木可能同时出现是“行为”和无数其他拼写错误的单词的拼写错误。我考虑了 Dodd 和 Wolterstorff 可以对这个违反直觉的结果做出反应的各种方式,并认为咬紧牙关以及附近的观点是不可信的。因此,
更新日期:2020-11-07
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