According to what used to be the standard view (Poincaré, Wang, etc.), although Frege endorses, and Kant denies, the claim that arithmetic is reducible to logic, there is not a substantive disagreement between them because their conceptions of logic are too different. In his “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism,” John MacFarlane aims to establish that Frege and Kant do share enough of a conception of logic for this to be a substantive, judicable dispute. MacFarlane maintains that for both Frege and Kant, the fundamental defining characteristic of logic is “that it provides norms for thought as such” (MacFarlane, 2002, p.57). I defend the standard view. I show that MacFarlane's argument rests on conflating the way that pure general logic is normative as a canon and as a propaedeutic, and that once these are distinguished the argument is blocked.

中文翻译：

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康德、弗雷格和逻辑的规范性：麦克法兰对共同点的论证

按照过去的标准观点（庞加莱、王等），虽然弗雷格赞同，康德否认算术可以还原为逻辑的说法，但他们之间并没有实质性的分歧，因为他们的逻辑概念过于复杂。不同的。在他的“弗雷格、康德和逻辑主义中的逻辑”中，约翰麦克法兰旨在确定弗雷格和康德确实共享了足够多的逻辑概念，以使其成为一个实质性的、可审判的争论。麦克法兰坚持认为，对于弗雷格和康德来说，逻辑的基本定义特征是“它为这样的思想提供规范”（麦克法兰，2002 年，第 57 页）。我捍卫标准观点。我表明，麦克法兰的论点建立在将纯一般逻辑作为规范和作为先导的规范性的方式混为一谈的基础上，一旦将它们区分开来，该论点就被阻止了。