• Suicide and Sovereignty in William Wordsworth
• Andrew Bennett (bio)

The problem of suicide is the problem of sovereignty. Twentieth-century suicide theorists such as Jean Baechler, Jean Améry, Anthony Giddens, and Simon Critchley argue that in taking one's own life the individual "proclaims his autonomy and sovereignty" over that life; that the subject who decides to commit suicide acts in "full sovereignty"; that the act often involves a "grasping toward omnipotence"; and that in killing herself the subject assumes a "fantasy of total affirmation" and "absolute freedom" (Baechler 48; Améry 61; Giddens 113; Critchley, Very Little 80–81; see also Critchley, Notes).¹ In fact, however, in this respect, twentieth-century writers draw on centuries-long traditions of commentary on suicide in philosophy, jurisprudence, ethics, and theology even as they challenge and indeed reverse traditional judgements on the act. Thus, for the majority of eighteenth-century writers on suicide—those who argued against the relatively rare "atheist," "infidel," "materialist," or "free-thinker" who was bold enough to explore and promulgate the thinking of luminaries such as Voltaire and David Hume—suicide contravenes fundamental dictates of religion, nation, and nature. As the historian Jeffrey Merrick puts it, for eighteenth-century writers the suicide "undermines the basis of all laws" because he or she avoids the possibility of punishment (5: ix).² In discussions of the theology, law, psychology, and ethics of suicide in pamphlets, sermons, letters, and even book-length studies, appeals are regularly made to an assumed natural law of self-preservation, and, as an anonymous writer in the Annual Register for 1764 comments, once the legal prohibition on suicide is contravened, "the foundation of other laws is shaken" (qtd. in Merrick 6: 223). If life and death are the "unalienable prerogative of the universal Sovereign," as the Presbyterian minister Caleb Fleming contends in 1773, then the illegitimate adoption of that prerogative by a human subject is an act of "high-treason"; in this sense, it is an act that offends "not only against the sovereignty of the universal Lord, but against the laws of human society" (qtd. in Merrick 5: 47). William Davy spells out the standard rationale for such an argument in his 1799 "Sermons Against Suicide, or Self-Murder": [End Page 39]

We have no Right to destroy ourselves:—For, to do this without Blame, a Man must be at perfect Liberty both by the Laws of God and Man, and independent on them both: There must be no Obligation on him, either from the Law of Nature and right Reason, or from the revealed Law of God, or from his lawful Superiors upon Earth.

(qtd. in Merrick 5: 412)

By taking on itself the properly instituted rights of Nature, Reason, the Judicial System, and the Almighty, the act of suicide is conceived of as an affront to all forms of authority.

It is perhaps not surprising, in this context, that William Wordsworth's various poetic engagements with, and interventions in, debates on suicide revolve around the question of sovereignty. Wordsworth's views develop from the early 1790s to the early 1800s, beginning with a sense of suicide as a kind of instinct and a permanent human temptation, before moving to a more nuanced—and more troubled—consideration of the social, economic, and political conditions from which the impulse arises. In each case, the question of sovereignty is an essential but often disputed element in the text's poetic work. Although critics have rarely recognized suicide as a particular focus of concern for Wordsworth, a significant number of his poems refer to the act—even if in tentative, veiled, indirect, or allusive ways in poems that appear to have quite different themes. In this essay, I will examine poems in which Wordsworth addresses the question of the sovereignty of suicide in order both to highlight the extent of his engagement with this fundamental aspect of human behavior and to begin to analyze its implications and consequences. I will suggest that, in his representations of suicide and suicidal individuals, Wordsworth's poems work in varied and complex ways to contest the implicit assumption of the sovereignty of suicide embedded within absolutist religioethical and juridical proscriptions...

• 威廉·华兹华斯的自杀与主权
• 安德鲁·贝内特（生物）

自杀问题是主权问题。二十世纪自杀理论家，例如让·拜勒（Jean Baechler），让·阿梅里（JeanAméry），安东尼·吉登斯（Anthony Giddens）和西蒙·克里奇利（Simon Critchley），都认为个人在夺取自己的生命后会“宣布自己的自治和主权”。决定自杀的主体具有“完全主权”；该行为经常涉及“向无所不能的掠夺”；并且在自杀过程中，受试者会表现出“完全肯定的幻想”和“绝对的自由”（Baechler 48；Améry61； Giddens 113； Critchley，非常少80-81；另请参见Critchley，注释）。^1个然而，实际上，在这方面，二十世纪的作家在哲学，法理学，伦理学和神学方面借鉴了长达数世纪的关于自杀的评论传统，尽管他们挑战并确实颠覆了对该行为的传统判断。因此，对于十八世纪大多数自杀的作家来说，那些反对相对罕见的“无神论者”，“异教徒”，“唯物主义者”或“自由思想者”的人大胆地探索和宣扬了名人的思想。如伏尔泰和大卫·休ume（David Hume）等人的自杀行为违反了宗教，民族和自然的基本原则。正如历史学家杰弗里·梅里克（Jeffrey Merrick）所说，对于18世纪的作家来说，自杀“破坏了所有法律的基础”，因为他或她避免了惩罚的可能性（5：ix）。^2个在关于小册子，布道，信件，甚至书本长度研究的自杀的神学，法律，心理学和伦理学的讨论中，人们经常呼吁人们假设一种自然的自我保护法则，并且，作为一名匿名作者，年度登记册在1764年的评论中，一旦违反了关于自杀的法律禁令，“其他法律的基础就被动摇了”（qtd。in Merrick 6：223）。如果正如长老会部长卡莱布·弗莱明（Caleb Fleming）在1773年所主张的那样，生与死是“普遍主权的不可剥夺的特权”，那么人类主体对这一特权的非法采纳就是“叛国行为”；从这个意义上讲，这是一种冒犯“不仅违反普遍主的主权，而且违反人类社会的法律”的行为（《梅里克》第5章第47节）。威廉·戴维（William Davy）在他的1799年“反对自杀或自谋杀人的证言”中阐明了此类论点的标准理由：[完39页]

我们没有权利毁灭自己：-为了做到这一点，没有罪，一个人必须在上帝和人的律法下都处于完全的自由，并且要独立于两者：不得有任何义务，无论是法律还是法律上的义务。自然法则和正确的理性，或者是上帝启示的法律，或者是他在地球上的合法上司。

（在《梅里克》第5卷第412页）

通过承担适当设定的自然，理性，司法系统和全能者的权利，自杀行为被认为是对所有形式权威的侮辱。

在这种情况下，威廉·华兹华斯（William Wordsworth）关于自杀辩论的各种诗意交往和干预行为围绕主权问题也许并不奇怪。华兹华斯的观点从1790年代初期到1800年代初期发展，首先是将自杀视为一种本能和一种永久的人类诱惑，然后才转向对社会，经济和政治状况的更细微，更麻烦的考虑。从中产生冲动。在每种情况下，主权问题都是文本诗歌作品中必不可少的但经常引起争议的要素。尽管评论家很少将自杀视为华兹华斯关注的重点，但他的大量诗作都提到了这一行为-即使是暂时的，隐蔽的，间接的，或主题似乎完全不同的诗歌中的寓意方式。在本文中，我将研究华兹华斯在其中探讨自杀主权问题的诗歌，以突出他对人类行为这一基本方面的参与程度，并开始分析其含义和后果。我会建议，在他对自杀和自杀个体的表述中，华兹华斯的诗歌以多种多样和复杂的方式运作，以反驳绝对主义的宗教伦理和司法禁令中所蕴含的自杀主权的隐含假设... 我将研究华兹华斯在其中探讨自杀主权问题的诗歌，以突出他对人类行为这一基本方面的参与程度，并开始分析其含义和后果。我会建议，在他对自杀和自杀个体的表述中，华兹华斯的诗歌以多种多样和复杂的方式运作，以反驳绝对主义的宗教伦理和司法禁令中所蕴含的自杀主权的隐含假设... 我将研究华兹华斯在其中探讨自杀主权问题的诗歌，以突出他对人类行为这一基本方面的参与程度，并开始分析其含义和后果。我会建议，在他对自杀和自杀个体的表述中，华兹华斯的诗歌以多种多样和复杂的方式运作，以反驳绝对主义的宗教伦理和司法禁令中所蕴含的自杀主权的隐含假设...