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Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity ed. by Kate A. Moran (review)
Journal of the History of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-16 , DOI: 10.1353/hph.2021.0012
Desmond Hogan

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:

  • Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity ed. by Kate A. Moran
  • Desmond Hogan
Kate A. Moran, editor. Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 309. Cloth, £75.00.

This fine collection of essays is dedicated to Paul Guyer. It includes work by distinguished experts and younger scholars across a range of topics in Kant’s theoretical, moral, and political philosophy.

Karl Ameriks’s “On the Many Senses of ‘Self-Determination’” responds to two misreadings of Kantian autonomy. One dismisses its notion of self-determination, the source of the auto-in autonomy, as an excessively subjective basis for morality; the other interprets its nomos as involving excessive determination of will by reason or sensibility. Ameriks responds with careful analysis of Kant’s “provocative language” concerning the authorship and legislation of morality (186). This includes Kant’s famous description of the will as “giving the law to itself [selbstgesetzgebend] and just because of this as first subject to the law” (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Ak. 4:431). Such formulations, Ameriks argues, do not pick out a “willful process” that undermines objectivity. They reflect Kant’s effort to ground the “strict universality, tantamount to necessity” already imputed to morality in Groundwork II (180). Kant’s concept of moral self-determination thus emerges from the search for a suitable locus for an unconditionally necessary principle of value. Its situation in practical reason justifies talk of “authorship”; however, Kant’s meaning has only “partial, metaphorical overlaps with familiar notions of empirical authorship and legislation” (186). [End Page 152]

Kate Moran’s “Inclination, Need, and Moral Misery” sets out from the Groundwork’s notorious claim that “to be free” of inclination “must be the wish of every rational person” (Ak. 4:428). The crucial context, Moran reminds us, is Kant’s effort to exclude inclination as a possible candidate for the absolute worth attributed to humanity. An association of inclination with need, she argues, explains inclination’s morally problematic status. Kant is especially concerned with acquired needs that “change and grow with the indulgence that one allows them,” resulting in a burdensome counterweight to morality and moral misery (KpV, Ak. 5:118). Concern about need’s corrupting potential is consistent with the doctrine of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone that natural inclinations are “good in themselves” (Ak. 5:158).

Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s “Kant on Imagination and Object Constitution” offers a compressed presentation of the argument of half of his 2018 Cambridge University Press book on Kant’s theory of imagination (its other half concerns imagination in aesthetics). Horstmann skillfully defends the partial independence of Kant’s productive imagination vis-à-vis the understanding, emphasizing imagination’s indispensability as a “discerning” power in empirical apprehension—the first stage in Kant’s account of empirical object-constitution.

Along with Allen Wood, Patricia Kitcher (“Guyer on the Value of Freedom”) takes issue with Guyer’s interpretation of Kantian morality as “means to the preservation,” “promotion,” or “maximization” of freedom. She also challenges Guyer’s view that Kant regards freedom and morality as valuable “primarily as the necessary condition [of] universal happiness” (90). This is not entailed by Kant’s theory of the “highest good” (summum bonum)—though that includes universal moral perfection and proportional, thus presumably universal, happiness. Guyer’s “happiness-friendly Kant” can receive only qualified endorsement given the merely conditional value of happiness, on account of which it cannot ground morality (105). Kitcher’s reading draws solid support from published texts, and from an unpublished note asserting “happiness is no true good [kein wahres Gut].” The note’s continuation shows, to the reader’s relief, that Kant’s target is again only happiness’s unconditional value: “Worthiness is a true and the highest good, but not the complete good” (Ak. 19:187; cf. KpV, Ak. 5:111).

Here I can only indicate a few other highlights. Barbara Herman’s “Religion and the Highest Good” offers a new and intriguing reading of the Religion’s Christology. She reads it as a contribution to the “moral imagination” that helps us manage guilt and anxiety arising from a propensity to evil that threatens to derail our moral identities (226). The Religion...



中文翻译:

《关于自由与自发的康德》 ed。凯特·莫兰(Kate A.Moran)发表(评论)

代替摘要,这里是内容的简要摘录:

审核人:

  • 《关于自由与自发的康德》 ed。凯特·莫兰(Kate A.Moran)
  • 德斯蒙德·霍根(Desmond Hogan)
凯特·莫兰(Kate A. Moran),编辑。康德关于自由与自发性。剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2018年。xiii + 309.布,£75.00。

这本精美的论文集是献给Paul Guyer的。它包括杰出的专家和年轻学者的工作,涉及康德的理论,道德和政治哲学的一系列主题。

卡尔·阿默里克斯(Karl Ameriks)的“关于自决的多种意义”回应了对康德自治的两种误读。其中驳回其概念-determination的源汽车-in自主权,作为道德过分主观的基础; 另一方则将其解释理解为是出于理性或理性对意志的过度决定。Ameriks在回应时仔细分析了康德关于道德的作者和法律的“挑衅性语言”(186)。这包括康德对遗嘱的著名描述,即“将法律赋予自己[ selbstgesetzgebend ],并且正因为如此,它成为法律的第一主体”(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,Ak。4:431)。Ameriks认为,这样的表述不会挑出破坏客观性的“故意过程”。它们反映了康德在“基础工作II”(180)中归于道德的“严格的普遍性,等同于必要性”的努力。因此,康德的道德自决概念源自为无条件必要的价值原则寻找合适的场所的过程。从实际的角度来看,这种情况证明了“作者身份”的合理性。然而,康德的含义只有“与经验著作权和立法的熟悉概念部分地,隐喻地重叠”(186)。[结束页152]

凯特·莫兰(Kate Moran)的“倾向,需要和道德苦难”从Groundwork臭名昭著的主张中阐明,“自由”的倾向“必须是每个理性人的愿望”(Ak。4:428)。莫兰(Moran)提醒我们,关键的背景是康德(Kant)努力避免将倾向作为可能归因于人类的绝对价值的候选人。她认为,倾向与需求之间的联系解释了倾向在道德上的问题地位。康德特别关注获得的需求,这些需求“随着人们允许他们的放纵而改变并增长”,从而导致对道德和道德苦难的沉重负担(KpVAk。5:118)。对需求腐败潜能的担忧与“仅在理性范围内的宗教教义”是一致的 自然的倾向是“有益的”(可5:158)。

罗尔夫·彼得·霍斯特曼(Rolf-Peter Horstmann)的“关于想象和客体构成的康德”对他的2018年剑桥大学出版社书中有关康德想象力理论的论点进行了压缩展示(另一半涉及美学中的想象力)。霍斯特曼巧妙地捍卫了康德的生产性想象相对于理解的部分独立性,强调了想象力作为经验理解中的“区分”力量是不可缺少的,这是康德对经验客体构成的第一阶段。

帕特里夏·凯彻(Patricia Kitcher)(“自由价值的导师”)与艾伦·伍德(Allen Wood)一起反对盖耶(Guyer)将康德式道德解释为“意味着保存,促进或最大化自由”。她还挑战了盖耶(Guyer)的观点,即康德认为自由和道德“很重要,首先是普遍幸福的必要条件”(90)。康德的“最高利益”(bonum sumum)理论并没有做到这一点,尽管其中包括普遍性。道德上的完美和成比例的幸福,因此可能是普遍的幸福。盖耶的“对幸福友好的康德”只能获得有条件的认可,因为它仅仅是幸福的条件价值,因此,它不能以道德为基础(105)。Kitcher的阅读获得了出版文本和未发表的声明的坚定支持,该声明断言“幸福不是真正的好[ kein wahres Gut ]。” 注释的续篇让读者感到宽慰,康德的目标再次只是幸福的无条件价值:“幸福是真实的,最高的善,而不是完整的善”(约19:187;比照KpV,第5章) :111)。

在这里,我只能指出其他一些重点。芭芭拉·赫尔曼(Barbara Herman)的“宗教与最高品位”对宗教的基督教学进行了新颖而有趣的解读。她认为这是对“道德想象力”的贡献,有助于我们处理因邪恶倾向而引起的罪恶感和焦虑感,这有可能使我们的道德身份脱轨(226)。在宗教...

更新日期:2021-03-16
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