Journal of the History of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-16 , DOI: 10.1353/hph.2021.0014 Gunnar Hindrichs
Reviewed by:
- For the Love of Metaphysics: Nihilism and the Conflict of Reason from Kant to Rosenzweig by Karin Nisenbaum
- Gunnar Hindrichs
Nisenbaum offers an account of philosophical evolution in the wake of Kant’s critical revolution. She intends “to show that the development of post-Kantian German Idealism is propelled by the different interpretations, appropriations, and radicalizations of the Kantian view that the representation of the unconditioned (or absolute) by finite beings is a topic of practical, not theoretical, philosophy” (11). While this claim is not new, the different constellations within which it is established are new and original, as is the guiding thread of the book’s argument.
There are three such constellations. The first inventively combines Jacobi with Maimon. The second conventionally features early Schelling and Fichte. The last imaginatively associates middle Schelling with Rosenzweig, thereby allowing the argument to reach into the twentieth century. The thread that ties these constellations together is the following. Kant’s philosophy centers on the inner conflicts into which reason inevitably runs when it addresses metaphysical questions that it cannot answer. Since the last clause is to be read as meaning “that it cannot answer theoretically,” practical answers remain possible. This is the idea of the primacy of practical reason in metaphysical matters, which unfolds through the three constellations mentioned above. Jacobi demonstrates that theoretical reason, inasmuch as it is deprived of practical common sense, terminates in a rational monism that annihilates all reality; Maimon shows that a philosophical system has to be actualized by a person; and they both show that the specter of nihilism can be exorcised only by a practically actualized metaphysics. Next, early Schelling, in Fichte’s footsteps, grounds reason as a whole in the practical. Nisenbaum connects her historical exploration to a systematic discussion of transcendental arguments that deserves to be highlighted. According to her, these arguments (1) implement a coherentist strategy that consists in making explicit the presuppositional relations between our beliefs, (2) show that these relations hold in virtue of the self’s relationship with itself, and (3) invite others to adopt a philosophical standpoint that they are free to accept or reject. Finally, reading Schelling and Rosenzweig together shows that solving the conflict of reason amounts to the religious attitude of affirming the value of the world and of human action in it. This last constellation reveals that the finitude of our cognition is grounded in the incompleteness of being, so much so that all theoretical claims about God are in fact refusals of this metaphysical incompleteness, whereas our practical commitments and values are means of God’s revelation, because they accept His theoretical unknowability. [End Page 155]
This is an excellent book, and it is essential for further research on the development of post-Kantian thought. I must note, however, that I disagree with some of its main tenets. Most importantly, I believe that the primacy of practical reason needs a different interpretation. In Kant, the primacy of practical reason is a rational connective that unifies the interest of theoretical reason, namely, knowledge, with the interest of practical reason, namely, ethical action, by deciding which commitments of theoretical reason are necessary in the service of the practical interest. This does not mean that metaphysics falls into the domain of practical reason. Rather, the central question of whether the cognizable world is structured for a moral agent remains beyond the scope of that connective. In order to answer that question, Kant draws on an Augustinian-Lutheran distinction that Leibniz had already employed, stating that theoretical and practical reason refer to the regnum naturae and the regnum gratiae, respectively. In Protestant orthodoxy, these realms are irreconcilable: postlapsarian nature and grace will not come together until the regnum gloriae at the end of times. If we take into account this background of the distinction used by Kant, the metaphysical question of a world structured for a moral agent is a question neither for theoretical reason nor for practical reason. It will instead receive its answer in...
中文翻译:
对于形而上学的热爱:虚无主义与从康德到罗森茨维格的理性冲突,卡琳·尼森鲍姆(Karin Nisenbaum)(评论)
代替摘要,这里是内容的简要摘录:
审核人:
- 对于形而上学的热爱:虚无主义与理性冲突(从康德到罗森茨威格),卡琳·尼森鲍姆(Karin Nisenbaum)
- 贡纳尔·辛德里奇(Gunnar Hindrichs)
在康德的批判革命之后,尼森鲍姆(Nisenbaum)提供了哲学演变的说明。她打算“表明,后康德后的德国唯心主义的发展是由康德人的不同解释,挪用和激进主义所推动的,康德人认为有限的存在代表无条件的(或绝对的)是一个实际的话题,而不是理论的话题。 ,哲学”(11)。尽管该主张不是新的,但建立该主张的不同星座都是新的和原始的,正如本书论点的指导思想一样。
有三个这样的星座。第一个发明人将Jacobi与Maimon结合在一起。第二个通常以早期Schelling和Fichte为特色。最后一个在想象力上将中间的谢林与罗森茨威格联系在一起,从而使这一论点进入了二十世纪。将这些星座连接在一起的线程如下。康德的哲学思想集中在内部冲突上,当它解决无法回答的形而上学问题时,不可避免地会导致原因。由于最后一句应理解为“它在理论上无法回答””,实际的答案仍然是可能的。这就是在形而上学问题中将实践理性放在首位的想法,这种想法通过上述三个星座得以展现。雅各比(Jacobi)证明,理论理性由于被剥夺了实践常识,因此以消灭所有现实的理性一元论终结。迈蒙表明,一个人必须实现一个哲学体系。他们都表明,虚无主义的幽灵只有通过实践实现的形而上学才能被驱除。接下来,早期谢林(Shelling)在费希特(Fichte)的脚步下,将理性作为一个整体。尼森鲍姆(Nisenbaum)将她的历史探索与对先验论证的系统讨论联系起来,这一点值得强调。据她介绍,这些论点(1)实施了一种连贯的策略,该策略包括明确我们的信念之间的前提关系;(2)表明这些关系凭借自身与自身的关系而成立;以及(3)邀请其他人采取哲学立场,即他们可以自由接受或拒绝。最后,一起阅读谢林和罗森茨威格表明,解决理性冲突等于对宗教的态度,即肯定世界及其人类行为的价值。这最后一个星座表明,我们认知的有限性是基于存在的不完整性,以至于所有关于上帝的理论主张实际上都拒绝了形而上的不完整性,而我们的实际承诺和价值观却是上帝启示的手段,因为它们接受他的理论上的不可知性。(2)证明这些关系凭借自身与自身的关系而成立,并且(3)邀请他人采用哲学观点,即他们可以自由接受或拒绝。最后,一起阅读谢林和罗森茨威格表明,解决理性冲突等于对宗教的态度,即肯定世界及其人类行为的价值。这最后一个星座表明,我们认知的有限性是基于存在的不完整性,以至于所有关于上帝的理论主张实际上都拒绝了形而上的不完整性,而我们的实际承诺和价值观却是上帝启示的手段,因为它们接受他的理论上的不可知性。(2)证明这些关系凭借自身与自身的关系而成立,并且(3)邀请他人采用哲学观点,即他们可以自由接受或拒绝。最后,一起阅读谢林和罗森茨威格表明,解决理性冲突等于对宗教的态度,即肯定世界及其人类行为的价值。这最后一个星座表明,我们认知的有限性是基于存在的不完整性,以至于所有关于上帝的理论主张实际上都拒绝了形而上的不完整性,而我们的实际承诺和价值观却是上帝启示的手段,因为它们接受他的理论上的不可知性。一起阅读谢林和罗森茨威格表明,解决理性冲突就等于一种宗教态度,即是对世界及其人类行为价值的肯定。这最后一个星座表明,我们认知的有限性是基于存在的不完整性,以至于所有关于上帝的理论主张实际上都拒绝了形而上的不完整性,而我们的实际承诺和价值观却是上帝启示的手段,因为它们接受他的理论上的不可知性。一起阅读谢林和罗森茨威格表明,解决理性冲突就等于一种宗教态度,即是对世界及其人类行为价值的肯定。这最后一个星座表明,我们认知的有限性是基于存在的不完整性,以至于所有关于上帝的理论主张实际上都拒绝了形而上的不完整性,而我们的实际承诺和价值观却是上帝启示的手段,因为它们接受他的理论上的不可知性。[结束页155]
这是一本非常好的书,对于进一步研究后康德思想的发展是必不可少的。但是,我必须指出,我不同意其中的一些主要原则。最重要的是,我认为实践理性的至高无上需要不同的解释。在康德中,实践理性的至上性是一种理性的联系词,它通过确定理论理性的承诺对服务于人类的必要是必要的,从而将理论理性的利益(即知识)与实践理性的利益(即道德行为)统一起来。实际利益。这确实不是意味着形而上学属于实际理性领域。而是,关于可认知世界是否是为道德主体构造的核心问题仍然不在那个连接词的范围之内。为了回答这个问题,康德借鉴了奥古斯丁,路德区别莱布尼茨已经采用,说明理论和实践理性指的是REGNUM naturae和REGNUM gratiae分别。在新教徒的正统思想中,这些领域是不可调和的:后罗汉的天性和恩典要等到雷格纳德·格洛里亚(regnum gloriae)才能融为一体在时间的尽头。如果我们考虑到康德所使用的区分的这种背景,那么一个为道德主体构造的世界的形而上学问题就不是出于理论上的原因,也不是出于实践上的问题。相反,它将在...中收到其答案。