Abstract:

The relation between Hume's constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume's two definitions of 'cause' in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume's skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett's interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit a general susceptibility to two kinds of definition that all "sense-based concepts" share. Against Garrett, I argue that the definitions express an imperfection Hume finds only in our concept of causation. That imperfection is absent from other sense-based concepts, and prompts skeptical sentiments in Hume's conclusion to the Treatise's Book 1. I close by comparing my interpretation with those of Helen Beebee, Stephen Buckle, Galen Strawson and Paul Russell.

摘要：

休ume的建设性和怀疑性目标之间的关系一直是休ume翻译人员关注的重点。休ume在《论语》和《第一次探究》中对“原因”的两个定义显然代表了一项重要的建设性成就，但本文认为，必须根据休ume的怀疑主义来理解这些定义。我要解决的难题是，休ume给出了两个定义，而不是一个。我以唐·加勒特（Don Garrett）的解释为箔纸，以发展我的另类怀疑主义解释。加勒特声称，这些定义对所有“基于感官的概念”共有的两种定义都表现出普遍敏感性。我反对Garrett，我认为这些定义表达了休ume仅在我们的因果关系概念中发现的缺陷。其他基于感觉的概念没有这种缺陷，