The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) To show the basic contours of transcendental subjectivity in the later work of Edmund Husserl, especially the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, and in the strictly phenomenological work of Michel Henry, especially Material Phenomenology; (2) to highlight Henry’s radical critique of Husserlian intersubjectivity and show that such critique, while valuable in its intention, is ultimately misguided because it neglects the important contribution Husserl’s complicated vocabulary of lifeworld makes to the study of intersubjectivity; and (3) to point toward a phenomenological conception of intersubjective practice we may call the realm of we-synthesis that prioritizes the first-person perspective rooted in empathy, which enables meaningful engagement with the second-person perspective. Working in conjunction with Husserl and Henry on the phenomenological conception of shared life enables the recuperation of the fragile line between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

本文的目的包括三个方面：（1）在埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl）的后期著作中，特别是在笛卡尔的沉思与危机中，以及在迈克尔·亨利的严格现象学著作中，尤其是物质现象学中，显示先验主观性的基本轮廓。; （2）强调亨利对侯赛尔主体间性的激进批判，并表明这种批评虽然意图上很有价值，但最终却被误导了，因为它忽略了胡塞尔复杂的生活世界词汇对主体间性研究的重要贡献；（3）指向主体间实践的现象学概念，我们可以称谓我们综合的领域，该领域优先考虑植根于同理心的第一人称视角，从而使人与第二人称视角有意义地互动。与胡塞尔（Husserl）和亨利（Henry）一起研究共享生命的现象学概念，可以使主观性和主体间性之间的脆弱界限得以恢复。