Previous commentators on Plato’s Republic have relied on mistaken assumptions about the requirements for Plato’s theory of justice: that Plato establishes a bi-conditional between proper psychic rule and the performance of conventionally just acts. They believe that if Plato does not establish this bi-conditional, then his theory of justice as a virtue will succumb to the fallacy of irrelevance. I claim Plato need not meet that requirement. A novel interpretation of the arguments of Book IV concerning justice in the soul suffices to dispense with one aspect of the bi-conditional – that conventional justice must imply justice as psychic harmony. Then, situating the theory of justice as psychic harmony in the context of the divided line, and in the dialectical ascent in the education of the philosopher-rulers, I show that the other conditional requirement – that justice in the soul must imply the performance of conventionally just actions – is also mistaken.

以前关于柏拉图共和国的评论员都基于对柏拉图正义理论要求的错误假设：柏拉图在适当的心理规则和传统正义行为的表现之间建立了一个双重条件。他们认为，如果柏拉图没有建立这种双重条件，那么他的正义理论作为一种美德将屈服于无关紧要的谬误。我声称柏拉图不需要满足该要求。对第四本书论点的新颖解释关于灵魂中的正义就足以免除双条件的一个方面，即传统正义必须暗示正义是心理上的和谐。然后，在分界线的背景下，以及在哲学统治者的教育中的辩证上升的基础上，将正义理论作为心理和谐的前提，我表明了另一个条件性要求-灵魂中的正义必须暗示着人类的表现。传统上只是行动–这也是错误的。