This article focuses on how and why some Jordanian Muslim Brothers have engaged in relatively exclusive, Islamist ways of confronting the regime during the “Arab Spring,” while others adopted a more inclusive, national strategy in the same period. As such, this article not only contributes to our knowledge of divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but also shows how this can impact Islamist-regime relations in the Arab world. It argues that the organization as a whole initially wanted to exploit the uprisings in the region through a relatively exclusive, Islamist approach to the regime, but that others within the organization disagreed with this method as the “Arab Spring” proved mostly unsuccessful. Aware of the dangers of provoking the state from a position of increased isolation, these members advocated a more inclusive attitude toward the regime and others. While both groups were ultimately unsuccessful, the latter at least survived as a legal entity, while the Muslim Brotherhood lost its official presence in the kingdom because the regime was able to exploit the existing divisions within the organization.

本文着眼于一些约旦穆斯林兄弟如何以及为什么在“阿拉伯之春”期间采取相对排斥的伊斯兰方式与政权对抗，而其他一些则在同一时期采取了更具包容性的国家战略。因此，本文不仅有助于我们了解约旦穆斯林兄弟会内部的分歧，而且还表明这将如何影响阿拉伯世界的伊斯兰政权关系。它认为，整个组织最初希望通过相对独占的，伊斯兰主义的政权来利用该地区的起义，但该组织中的其他人不同意这种方法，因为“阿拉伯之春”多数情况下是不成功的。意识到从日益孤立的立场中挑衅国家的危险，这些成员主张对政权和其他方面采取更具包容性的态度。虽然这两个团体最终都没有成功，但后者至少作为一个法人得以幸存，而穆斯林兄弟会则失去了在该王国的正式存在，因为该政权能够利用该组织内部现有的部门。