In this paper I am concerned with the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science from the perspective of philosophy. In particular, I examine two philosophical objections against the idea that the history of science can provide evidences to the philosophy of science. The first objection is metaphysical and suggests that given Hume’s law, i.e. that norms cannot be derived from facts and given that the history of science is a descriptive enterprise while the philosophy of science is a normative endeavor, the former cannot be informative for the latter. The second is epistemological and is often called the ‘case studies dilemma’. According to this dilemma, we can neither deduce general philosophical theories from particular historical cases nor test the former through the latter. I argue that although those objections fail to be fatal for the idea that the historical data can provide evidence for the philosophical theories of science, they can help us draw a proper image of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. I conclude that this picture presupposes the constant epistemic iteration between the two disciplines.

在本文中，我从哲学的角度来关注科学史与科学哲学的关系。特别是，我研究了两个反对科学史可以为科学哲学提供证据的哲学反对意见。第一个反对意见是形而上学的，并表明鉴于休谟定律，即规范不能从事实中推导出来，并且鉴于科学史是描述性的事业，而科学哲学是规范性的努力，前者不能为后者提供信息。第二个是认识论的，通常被称为“案例研究困境”。根据这个困境，我们既不能从特定的历史案例中推导出一般的哲学理论，也不能通过后者来检验前者。我认为，虽然这些反对意见对于历史数据可以为科学哲学理论提供证据的观点来说不是致命的，但它们可以帮助我们正确描绘历史与科学哲学之间的关系。我的结论是，这张图以两个学科之间不断的认知迭代为前提。