I critically discuss Gerhard Schurz’ improved version of Hempel’s covering law model as the model appropriate for human action explanation in the historical sciences. Schurz takes so-called “normic laws” as the best means to save Hempel’s covering law model from the objection that there are no strict laws in historiography. I criticize Schurz approach in two respects: 1) Schurz falsely takes Dray’s account of historical explanations to be a normic law account. 2) Human action explanation in terms of goals and means-ends-beliefs are not based on normic laws at all, for the explanandum (the action) in an explanation follows from the volitional and doxastic premises (the explanans) alone. To show this, I argue that there is a conceptual connection between volition and action, rooted in our actual usage of volitional concepts. Ultimately, a difference in principle between the methods of explanation in science and historiography has to be acknowledged.

我批判性地讨论了 Gerhard Schurz 的 Hempel 覆盖定律模型的改进版本，作为适用于历史科学中人类行为解释的模型。舒尔茨将所谓的“规范法则”作为从史学中没有严格法则的反对意见中拯救Hempel覆盖法则模型的最佳手段。我从两个方面批评舒尔茨的方法：1）舒尔茨错误地将德雷对历史解释的解释视为规范法解释。2）人类行为的目标和手段-目的-信念的解释根本不是基于规范的规律，因为解释中的被解释（行动）仅来自意志和信念前提（被解释者）。为了证明这一点，我认为意志和行动之间存在概念上的联系，植根于我们对意志概念的实际使用。最终，