This essay contributes to a longstanding concern with the place of ethics in Islamic law, suggesting a reorientation of the debate through a consideration of the role of habituation in works of uṣūl and furūʿ. I demonstrate that the well-known emphasis on habituation in Aristotle’s ethics, and its underlying conception of character, exerted a heavy influence on writers of akhlāq works. I then examine the development of three fiqhī concepts – idmān, iqāma and iṣrār –to show how jurists embedded this conception of moral behavior in the discursive fiqh tradition, linking their disapproval of persistent sinful or morally distasteful behavior to a tangible legal effect: the forfeiture of the violator’s standing before the court. Based on this finding, I argue that jurists and moralists operated in a shared universe of normativity in which the commitment to habituation as a premier mode of ethical cultivation was held in common.

这篇文章引起了人们长期以来对伊斯兰教法中伦理学地位的关注，通过考虑习惯化在乌鲁尔和古隆作品中的作用，提出了对辩论的重新定位。我证明，亚里士多德伦理学中对习惯性的众所周知的强调及其潜在的性格观念，对阿赫拉克作品的作者产生了重大影响。然后，我考察了三个fiqhī概念（idmān，iqāma和iṣrār）的发展–到节目的法学家如何嵌入道德行为这一概念的话语律传统，他们的执着有罪或道德上令人反感的行为不以为然链接到一个有形的法律效力：在法庭上的违规者地位的丧失。基于这一发现，我认为法学家和道德主义者是在规范性的共同世界中运作的，在习惯性世界中，习惯化作为道德修养的主要模式的承诺是共同的。