The article deals with the recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of two Swedish midwives who claimed a right to conscientious objection to abortion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). After giving an overview of the relevant previous case-law of the Court, I argue that the decisions of inadmissibility in the midwives’ cases are a step backwards in the promising evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence that began with the judgments in the cases of Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom and Bayatyan v. Armenia. In particular, the Court’s reasoning in Grimmark v. Sweden and Steen v. Sweden failed to take into consideration the existence of a European consensus and the fact that less restrictive alternatives could have reasonably accommodated the conscientious claims of the two applicants.

这篇文章涉及欧洲人权法院最近对两名瑞典助产士的案件的裁决，她们根据《欧洲人权公约》( ECHR )第 9 条要求依良心拒绝堕胎的权利。在概述了法院以前的相关判例法之后，我认为，在助产士案件中不可受理的决定是法院判例的有希望演变的倒退，该判例始于对Eweida 和其他诉联合王国和巴亚特扬诉亚美尼亚。特别是，法院在Grimmark诉瑞典和Steen案中的推理v.瑞典没有考虑到欧洲共识的存在以及限制较少的替代方案可以合理地满足两位申请人的良心要求这一事实。