Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and what Peirce took to be ‘perfect knowledge’ lose their appeal in epistemology of science. From the points of view of the logic for pragmatics and the modal translations given in this article, conjecturability and pragmaticism provide an enriched epistemology for scientific practices that can accommodate both epistemic and non-epistemic values.

从可知性出发，争论主要涉及支持和反对现实主义或真理作为认识论与非认识论概念的案例。本文建议将皮尔斯的实用主义（这里称为“行动至上”的认识论）带到这个问题上。研究表明，比认识力弱的概念（即可猜想性）在认识论上更适合描述科学探究的基本组成部分。而且，与可知性不同，可猜想性不会遭受悖论的困扰。鉴于普遍存在的不确定性充斥着探究，可知性以及皮尔斯认为什么是“完美知识”，在科学认识论中就失去了吸引力。从实用逻辑和本文提供的模态翻译的角度来看，